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GOOD INTENTIONS, BUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
EXPANDING VIRGINIA'S MANUFACTURING TAX
EXEMPTION UNDER CITY OF WINCHESTER V.
AMERICAN WOODMARK CORP.
The Virginia Supreme Court recently opened the door to chal-
lenges by Virginia manufacturers requesting exemptions or
refunds of local property taxes with its decision in City of Win-
chester v. American Woodmark Corp.1 American Woodmark, a
nationwide furniture manufacturer headquartered in
Winchester, Virginia, filed suit against the City of Winchester in
1995 requesting a property tax refund of approximately half a
million dollars.2 Although American Woodmark did not perform
any manufacturing functions within the Winchester city limits,
the company argued that the computers and office equipment in
its corporate headquarters were exempt from the local personal
property tax because this equipment was "used in manufactur-
ing" under § 58.1-1101(A)(2) of the Virginia Code.' Coun-
terintuitively, the Virginia Supreme Court agreed.
As a result of this decision, cities and counties in Virginia now
face requests for tax refunds on a variety of property that busi-
nesses claim is "used in manufacturing."4 Prominent examples
1. 464 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 1995). The American Woodmark decision interpreted §
58.1-1101(A)(2) of the Virginia Code as excluding all tangible personal property of a
manufacturer from local taxation regardless of how indirectly the property relates to
the manufacturing function. See id. at 151.
2. See American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421 (1994),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 464 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 1995). The exact amount of the
refund request was $464,637. See id. at 430.
3. See id. at 431-32; see also infra note 38 (providing the text of Virginia Code §
58.1-1101(A)(2)).
4. Businesses that have made this claim include Coca-Cola bottling companies,
Goodyear, Sherwin Williams, Southern States, Lance Incorporated, IBM, and Xerox.
See William L. Heartwell, III, The "Tax Precluded" Manufacturer-Trying the Case,
Address at the Virginia Association of Local Government Attorneys 2 (Oct. 1998) (on
file with author). Businesses also appear to be targeting smaller jurisdictions with
these requests, presumably because they have fewer resources to respond to the
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include Coca-Cola, which claims that its vending machines are
"part of the manufacturing" of Coke,5 and Sherwin Williams,
which claims that equipment at its retail stores is "used in man-
ufacturing" paint.6 Local governments stand to lose millions of
dollars in tax revenues if these challenges succeed.7
This Note analyzes the impact of American Woodmark on
Virginia's personal property tax exemption for manufacturers,
comparing the recent consequences of the court's holding with
legislative and judicial intent. The first section describes the
constitutional and statutory background against which the
American Woodmark decision took place. The second section
presents an overview of American Woodmark and places the
court's holding in the context of previous decisions granting tax
exemptions to Virginia manufacturers. The third section com-
pares Virginia's personal property tax exemption for manufac-
turers with similar tax exemptions offered by other states.
Next, the fourth section discusses the repercussions of the
decision and argues that although Virginia's expansive exemp-
tion is consistent with the tax breaks offered in other states, the
challenges. For example, suits have been filed in various jurisdictions in Virginia, includ-
ing Botetourt, Bristol, Grayson, Halifax, Henry, Montgomery, Wythe, Smythe, and Wise
Counties. See Memorandum from Katherine Ashby, President, Commissioners of the
Revenue Association, to Jean Marshall Crawford, Legal Counsel, Arlington County Com-
missioner of the Revenue (May 4, 1998) (on file with author). These jurisdictions range in
size from approximately 16,300 to 75,500 persons. In comparison, Virginia's Arlington
County has a population of approximately 178,800. See WELDON COOPER CTR. FOR PUB.
SERV., VIRGINIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 555-58 (1996-97) [hereinafter VIRGINIA STATISTI-
cAL ABsTRAcT].
5. Joanne Poindexter, Court Rules Against Coke, RoANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Jan. 5, 1999, at B1.
6. See Heartwell, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Under Virginia's three-year statute of limitations, manufacturers can request
refunds from three years ago. See D. French Slaughter, III, Finding Coke in the
SALT Mines (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
As of June 30, 1993, Virginia's cities and counties collected a little over
$10.3 billion annually from local, state, and federal sources. Of that
amount 63.2 percent was locally generated, 30.3 percent state generated,
and 6.5 percent federally generated. Of the locally generated portion,
63.26 percent came from property taxes, 22.5 percent from other local
taxes, and 13.37 percent from other revenues such as fees, fines and
forfeitures, and charges for services.
STATE & LOCAL GoV'T RESPONSIBILITY & TAXING AUTH. COMMIN, INTERmI REPORT, H.
Doc. No. 62, Reg. Sess. 4 (Va. 1996).
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court's convoluted interprotation of the Virginia Code may have
unintended consequences for both consumers and Virginia cities
and counties. This Note concludes with suggestions for ways in
which local governments can defend against upcoming challenges
by manufacturers.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE
AMERICAN WOODMARK DECISION
- Unlike the manufacturing exemptions offered by most states,
Virginia's exemption is fairly convoluted' because it classifies
tangible property as intangible property for tax purposes. 9 In
general, personal property is usually divided into two categories:
tangible and intangible." Tangible personal property is "property
which is touchable and has real [physical] existence."" Examples
include motor vehicles, jewelry, books, or computer equipment.' 2
Intangible property, on the other hand, is "property which can-
not be touched because it has no physical existence."" Intangible
property also includes property that has only representational
value;' 4 examples include corporate stock, bonds, goodwill, or
franchises. 5
Unlike most states, Virginia classifies a number of items of a
manufacturer's tangible personal property as intangible for prop-
erty tax purposes.' 6 According to the Virginia Constitution,'7 the
8. See Jean Crawford, Intangible v. Tangible Property Taxes: A Primer on
Virginia's "Peculiar" Business Property Tax, Address at the Virginia Association of
Local Government Attorneys 1 (Oct. 1998) (on file with author).
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999).
10. See Christine E. Reinhard, Comment, Tangible or Intangible-Is that the Ques-
tion? Conflict in the Texas Tax Classification System of Computer Software, 29 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 871, 881 (1998).
11. Id. at 881 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (6th ed. 1990)).
12. See VIRGINIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 662.
13. Reinhard, supra note 10, at 882 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed.
1990)).
14. See id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (6th ed. 1990)).
15. See VIRGINIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 662.
16. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also infra note 22 and accom-
panying text (providing examples of property classified as tangible in other states,
but intangible in Virginia).
17. There are three provisions of the Virginia Constitution that pertain to the clas-
sification and assessment of intangible personal property. See VA. CONST. art. X, §§
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General Assembly has the power to determine whether property
should be taxed at the state or local level.1 8 In 1942, the Virginia
Supreme Court in City of Roanoke v. James W. Michael's Bakery
Corp.,'9 extended this power to include the ability to classify
tangible personal property as intangible property.20 This exten-
sion essentially gave the General Assembly the authority to
merge the intangible and tangible categories together.
Virginia has five statutes concerning the local government
taxation of intangible personal property.2 ' As a result of
Michael's Bakery and the language of these five statutes, "a
taxpayer easily could owe tax on a number of tangible personal
property items used in a manufacturing business which are now
treated as if they were intangible personal property assets."22
This change in classification is important because under § 58.1-
1100 of the Virginia Code, intangible personal property is segre-
gated for state taxation only.23 In 1994, however, Virginia dis-
1, 4, 6. For the purposes of this discussion, the most important of these is Article X,
Section 1.
18. See VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. The text of this section reads:
The General Assembly may define and classify taxable subjects. Except
as to classes of property herein expressly segregated for either State or
local taxation, the General Assembly may segregate the several classes of
property so as to specify and determine upon what subjects State taxes,
and upon what subjects local taxes, may be levied.
Id.
19. 21 S.E.2d 788 (Va. 1942) (interpreting Article X, Section § 168 of the Virginia
Constitution as it appeared after its amendment in 1928).
20. See id. at 798 (holding that the General Assembly had the power to classify
the delivery trucks, furniture, and fixtures of a bakery as intangible personal proper-
ty that was not subject to local taxation). But see id. at 799 (Holt, J., dissenting)
("If a truck is not tangible, then the great globe itself is not.").
21. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-1100, -1101, -3507, -3508, -3508.1 (Michie 1997);
id. § 58.1-1101 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999). For purposes of this Note, § 58.1-1101
is the most important. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing the
current text of § 58.1-1101).
22. Craig D. Bell, Taxation, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1543, 1583 (1996). For example,
the Virginia Code now provides that tangible property used in manufacturing, min-
ing, radio or television broadcasting, dairy, dry cleaning, or laundry businesses shall
be considered intangible. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101 (Michie 1997 & Supp.
1999). As a result, local governments may only tax what is classified as "machinery
and tools," "motor vehicles," and "delivery equipment" of such businesses. Id. § 58.1-
3507.
23. See id. § 58.1-1100 (stating that "intangible personal property, including cap-
ital of a trade or business of any person, firm or corporation, except for merchants'
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continued its state tax on intangible personal property.' As a
result, property now classified as intangible personal property is
not taxed by either the state or local povernment.
The court's decision in Michael's Bakery also made it difficult
for cities and counties to challenge directly the constitutionality
of Virginia's intangible personal property tax scheme.25 As a
result, recent challenges by local tax authorities focused on
"carving out" items of tangible personal property, which would
be subject to local tax, by narrowly interpreting the definition of
intangible personal property.26 American Woodmark, however,
indicates that the Virginia Supreme Court is not receptive to
these challenges."
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN WOODMARK DECISION
In 1994, American Woodmark filed suit against the City of
Winchester alleging that the company used its personal property
in its manufacturing business, and therefore, the property was
exempt from local taxation.2" American Woodmark manufactures
and sells wooden kitchen and bathroom cabinets nationwide.29
The company's corporate headquarters, located in the City of
Winchester,3 0 established and monitored the overall corporate
strategy, maintained the company's computer system, and en-
gaged in the sales and marketing of cabinets and vanities pro-
duced by manufacturing facilities located outside of Virginia.31
The primary issue in American Woodmark was whether the
law should treat a taxpayer's furniture, computers, and office
capital as defined in § 58.1-3510 which shall be subject to local taxation, is hereby
segregated for state taxation only").
24. See 1984 Va. Acts ch. 729, § 58-405(D).
25. See Bell, supra note 22, at 1586.
26. See id.
27. See City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (Va.
1995) (holding that the taxpayer's property was capital used in a manufacturing bus-
iness that was not subject to taxation by the city).
28. See American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421 (1994),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 464 S.E.2d 148, 150 (Va. 1995).
29. See Collins Denny, III, Personal Property, Tangible in Fact, Used In a Manu-
facturing Business-American Woodmark I, Address at the Virginia Association of
Assessing Officers Education Seminar 1 (July 11, 1996).
30. See id.
31. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 150.
20001 1137
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1133
equipment, located in its corporate headquarters, as intangible
personal property under the Virginia Code. 2 At the time, the
Code defined intangible personal property as:
Capital which is personal property, tangible in fact, used in
manufacturing.... Machinery and tools, motor vehicles and
delivery equipment of such businesses shall not be defined as
intangible personal property for purposes of this chapter and
shall be taxed locally as tangible personal property according
to the applicable provisions of law relative to such property."3
Affirming the circuit court's decision, the Virginia Supreme
Court stated that "we decline the City's invitation to construe
Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2) as requiring that a manufacturer main-
tain a manufacturing facility within the City's geographical
boundaries or that the manufacturer's capital, which is personal
property, tangible in fact, be used 'directly' in the manufacturing
process."34 The court placed the burden on the City of Win-
chester to prove that American Woodmark's corporate headquar-
ters was not engaged in a manufacturing business, and it found
that the evidence "fell short of carrying that burden."35 In short,
despite the fact that no actual manufacturing activity occurred
at American Woodmark's corporate headquarters, the court held
that the furniture, office equipment, and computers located at
the site were "used in manufacturing," and therefore not subject
to tax by the City of Winchester.36
The Virginia legislature acted swiftly to codify the court's
holding in American Woodmark by amending Virginia Code §
58.1-1101(A)(2).37 The amendment added parenthetically the
following language to the section: "[Plersonal property, tangible
in fact, used in manufacturing (including, but not limited to,
32. See id. at 151.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Michie 1994). This section was amended in
1996 to reflect the decision in American Woodmark. See infra notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text.
34. American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
35. Denny, supra note 29, at 4.
36. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
37. See 1996 Va. Acts ch. 622, § 58.1-1101; see also Virginia General Assembly
(visited Mar. 15, 2000) <httpi/llegis.state.va.us> (indicating that the amendment was
introduced in the House on January 22, 1996 and voted out of the Senate on March
1, 1996).
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furniture, fixtures, office equipment and computer equipment
used in corporate headquarters). 8 Unanimous votes of both the
Virginia House and Senate approved the change, which became
effective July 1, 1996.39
The American Woodmark court adopted a very broad interpre-
tation of tangible personal property under § 58.1-1101(A)(2). As
a result of the court's decision and the subsequent statutory
change by the General Assembly, tangible personal property for
Virginia manufacturers is now defined as any property that is
owned by a manufacturer, but such property need not be used
directly in the manufacturing process.40 Enlarging the exemption
even further, the Virginia Supreme Court has narrowly defined
what constitutes "machinery and tools" for purposes of manufac-
turing.4 As a result, Virginia businesses are exempt from an
increasing number of local taxes. In short, afier American
Woodmark, any retailer who performs a small amount of manu-
facturing somewhere in its operation may claim an exemption
from its personal property tax obligations.42
There are three important parts of the American Woodmark
holding: (1) further defining "manufacturing" under § 58.1-1101;
(2) augmenting the definition of machinery and tools; and (3) the
finding that the locality, not the taxpayer, bears the burden of
refuting the tax exclusion.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999). The section now
reads:
Capital which is personal property, tangible in fact, used in manufactur-
ing (including, but not limited to, furniture, fixtures, office equipment and
computer equipment used in corporate headquarters) ... . Machinery
and tools, motor vehicles and delivery equipment of such businesses shall
not be defined as intangible personal property for purposes of this chap-
ter and shall be taxed locally as tangible personal property according to
the applicable provisions of law relative to such property.
Id.
39. See 1996 Va. Acts ch. 622, § 58.1-1101; see also Virginia General Assembly
(visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http-//legis.state.va.us> (indicating that the House voted 100
to zero in favor of the amendment, while the Senate approved the change by a vote
of 40 to zero).
40. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
41. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (explaining interpretations of the
"machinery and tools" exemption under Virginia Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2)).
42. See Heartwell, supra note 4, at 2.
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Defining Manufacturing
The Virginia Code did not define "manufacturing" under §
58.1-1101, 43 but over the years Virginia case law established the
essential elements of what constitutes "manufacturing."' 4 Busi-
nesses included as manufacturers under Virginia law are those
(1) transforming livestock into different meat products; 45 (2)
curing hams and bacon and making sausage;4 and (3) producing
and selling personal computers, file servers, and computer
parts.47 Businesses not qualifying as manufacturers include
those (1) pasteurizing milk and producing buttermilk;48 (2) killing
and plucking chickens; 49 and (3) blending rock and gravel.5" As the
Virginia Code indicates, classification as a manufacturer is impor-
tant not just for intangible personal property tax exemptions, 51
but also for exemptions relating to the Business, Professional,
Occupational and License (BPOL) tax,52 sales and use tax53 and
43. See Michael Long, Notes on Manufacturers' Claims 2 (Aug. 9, 1998) (on file
with author). As Long indicates, the Virginia Code provides definitions of the terms
"manufacturing, processing, refining, or conversion," but these definitions are limited
to applications of the retail sales and use tax. Id at 2 n.2 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §
58.1-602); see also 1996 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 212, 213 n.2 (noting that the definition
of manufacturing in § 58.1-602 is controlling in determining exemptions from local
taxation); 1983-1984 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 372, 372 (noting that the definition of "man-
ufacturing" in § 58-441.3(1) of the Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax is not control-
ling for local license tax purposes).
44. See Prentice v. City of Richmond, 90 S.E.2d 839, 843 (Va. 1956) (holding that
a city business license tax could be imposed on a business that cleaned and dismem-
bered chickens because the business was not a manufacturer). The Prentice court
found that manufacturing had three essential elements: "(1) original material re-
ferred to as raw material; (2) a process whereby the raw material is changed; and
(3) a resulting product which, by reason of being subjected to the processing, is dif-
ferent from the original raw material." I&.
45. See Morris & Co. v. Commonwealth, 83 S.E. 408, 409 (Va. 1914).
46. See Commonwealth v. Meyer, 23 S.E.2d 353, 353 (Va. 1942).
47. See Fairfax County v. DataComp Corp., 36 Va. Cir. 60 (1995).
48. See Richmond v. Dairy Co., 157 S.E. 728, 728 (Va. 1931).
49. See Prentice, 90 S.E.2d at 843-44.
50. See Solite Corp. v. County of King George, 261 S.E.2d 535, 535 (Va. 1980).
51. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101 (Michie-1997 & Supp. 1999).
52. See id. § 58.1-3703(c)(4) (Michie 1997) (stating that "[n]o county, city or town
shall impose a license fee or levy any license tax . . . [oin a manufacturer for the
privilege of manufacturing and selling goods, wares and merchandise at wholesale at
the place of manufacture . . . "
53. See id. § 58.1-609.3(2) (stating that property directly used in manufacturing or
EXPANDING TAX EXEMPTIONS
tax credits.' As a result, an important aspect of Amer-
ican Woodmark involves the court's analysis of who qualifies as
a manufacturer.
Over the years, the relevant question in defining manufactur-
ing for tax purposes changed from "what is manufacturing?" 55 to
"who is a manufacturer?"" American Woodmark adds another
layer to this analysis by holding that the exact location where
the manufacturing occurs does not matter.57 In its arguments
before the Virginia Supreme Court, the City of Winchester at-
tempted to limit the definition of manufacturer to a business
that carries on actual manufacturing operations within the tax-
ing locality.5 s The City argued that American Woodmark, despite
its extensive manufacturing operations throughout the country,
should not be classified as a manufacturer because it did not
conduct any manufacturing within the City.59
The court's American Woodmark holding essentially means
that location is irrelevant in determining whether the branch of
a business is a manufacturer. The components of the business
are taxable under the rules applicable to manufacturers generally,
no matter where the components, including the manufacturing
plant, are located. 60 The court rejected the City's argument that
processing is not subject to sales and use tax).
54. See id. § 58.1-439(c)(2) (indicating that tax credits are available for facilities in
qualifying industries, including manufacturing).
55. See Solite Corp., 261 S.E.2d at 536 (stating that manufacturing must "trans-
form[] the new material into an article or a product of substantially different charac-
ter, . . . [even if] the processing increases the value or usefulness of the product").
56. See County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 380 S.E.2d 890 (Va.
1989). Brown Boveri repaired used turbine generators used by electric power compa-
nies. See id at 891. The Virginia Supreme Court held that even though Brown
Boveri was engaged in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing activities, it would
"be classified as a manufacturer for tax purposes if the manufacturing portion of its
business [was] substantial" in comparison to its total activities. Id. at 893 (citation
omitted). The court held that in order to be considered "substantial" the manufactur-
ing component of a business must not be "de minimis, merely trivial, or only inci-
dental to its principal business." Id. at 893-94.
57. See Slaughter, supra note 7.
58. See City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 464 S.E.2d 148, 151 (Va.
1995).
59. See i&.
60. See Slaughter, supra note 7.
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the manufacturer's capital, which is personal property, tangible
in fact, must be used "directly" in the manufacturing process.6 '
Even though no manufacturing activity occurred at the com-
pany's corporate headquarters, equipment used at this site for
issuing payroll checks, paying bills, and processing credit appli-
cations was still considered "used in manufacturing" under the
Virginia Code.62
Defining Machinery and Tools
Under Virginia Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2), machinery and tools
are not treated as intangible personal property and, therefore,
are subject to local tax.6" In American Woodmark, the court for
the first time defined "machinery and tools" for Virginia tax
purposes," holding that only equipment used directly in the
manufacturing process fell under this definition. 5 The City of
Winchester argued that even if the company's office and computer
equipment was "used in manufacturing," this equipment should
be classified as machinery and tools under the Virginia Code
and therefore should be subject to local tax.66 The court dis-
agreed with this argument, and cited with approval the defini-
tion used for decades by the Virginia State Tax Commissioner
and the Virginia Attorney General: "'"[Miachinery and tools
used in a particular manufacturing business' are the machinery
and tools which are necessary in the particular manufacturing
business and which are used in connection with the operation of
machinery which is actually and directly used in the manufac-
turing process. """
61. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 151.
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); American
Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 151; supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2); supra note 38 (containing the text of
this section).
64. See Long, supra note 43, at 4-5 (stating that although the Virginia Code has
not defined "machinery and tools," the American Woodmark court adopted the Attor-
ney General's interpretation of the phrase in 1995).
65. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 153.
66. See id. at 152.
67. Id. (quoting 1985-86 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 316, 317 (quoting Letter from C.H.
Morrissett, former State Tax Commissioner, to the Honorable Fred G. Pollard (June
1142
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Using this test, the court found that American Woodmark's
furniture, office equipment, and computer equipment were not
"machinery and tools"6" within § 58.1-1101(A)(2) because these
items were not "used in connection with the operation of ma-
chinery which is actually and directly used in the manufacturing
process." 9 The court bolstered its opinion by noting that the
General Assembly failed to change the Attorney General's opin-
ion regarding the definition of machinery and tools, arguing that
this failure amounted to "legislative acquiescence" v° to the Attor-
ney General's opinion.
One criticism of this holding is that it relies unnecessarily on
a narrow definition of what constitutes "machinery and tools."
Though the Tax Department has construed narrowly the ma-
chinery and tools definition to limit the manufacturing equip-
ment taxable by localities,71 one reason for its narrow construc-
tion is that historically, manufacturing property that was not
taxed locally as machinery and tools was taxed by the state as
capital.72 This may help explain the Attorney General's narrow
reading of "machinery and tools" as only that equipment used
"directly in" the manufacturing process.73 Prior to 1985, property
that was not taxed on the local level could be taxed by the
state.74 Because the state currently does not tax capital or other
intangible personal property,75 however, this narrow interpreta-
tion may go too far in eliminating manufacturing property from
the local government tax base. In addition, the enabling statute
also allows for a broader reading, permitting local taxation of all
machinery and tools" ... used in a manufacturing... business"
under § 58.1-3507 or "of such [manufacturing] businesses...
under § 58.1-1101(A)(2). 76 Contrary to the court's holding in
27, 1950))) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
68. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 153.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Crawford, supra note 8, at 4.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that Virginia has discon-
tinued the state tax on intangible personal property).
76. Crawford, supra note 8, at 4; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3507, -1101(A)(2) (Michie
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American Woodmark, "machinery and tools" used in manufac-
turing could easily include equipment that is not used "directly"
in manufacturing.
A Tax Exception, Not a Tax Exemption
In American Woodmark, the Virginia Supreme Court also held
that Code sections 58.1-1100 and 58.1-1101(A)(2) are not tax ex-
emptions, but rather tax exceptions.77 According to the court,
these exceptions simply classify certain personal property, tangible
in fact, as intangible personal property and segregate that prop-
erty for state taxation. 78 This distinction is important because
tax exemptions and tax exceptions involve different rules of
statutory construction under Virginia law.79 In most cases, when
a taxpayer claims an exemption from a tax, the exemption is
construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing au-
thority.80 In American Woodmark, however, the court found that
the intangible property tax under § 58.1-1101 was simply a
general tax statute, not an exemption from a tax. The court
stated "statutes imposing taxes are to be construed most strongly
against the government, and in favor of the citizen, and are not
to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the
language used. Whenever there is a just doubt, 'that doubt
should absolve the taxpayer from his burden."' As a result, the
court found that the statute should be construed in favor of
American Woodmark and against the City.
2
1997 & Supp. 1999).
77. See City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 464 S.E.2d 148, 151 (Va.
1995).
78. See id. at 151-52.
79. See Bell, supra note 22, at 1593.
80. See VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(t); see also Carr v. Forst, 453 S.E.2d 274 (Va.
1995) (holding that the burden was on the taxpayer to prove that the ruling was
contrary to law or that the commissioner abused his discretion and acted unreason-
ably); Roberts v. Board of Supervisors, 453 S.E.2d 258 (Va. 1995) (holding that the
burden was on the taxpayer to show that he comes within the terms of the exemp-
tion).
81. American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting Commonwealth Natural Re-
sources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 791, 796 (Va. 1978)).
82. See id.
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INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES ON MANUFACTURING
EQUIPMENT IN OTHER STATES
American Woodmark extends the benefits of Virginia's personal
property tax exemption far beyond the factory gate, 3 and high-
lights the potentially broad scope of tax relief available for man-
ufacturers. Like Virginia, many states struggle with the appro-
priate method for taxing the intangible property of businesses.
For example, while Texas taxes both tangible and intangible
property,"M a number of states do not allow intangible property
to be taxed at all.85 In West Virginia, the 1997 legislature intro-
duced legislation to implement a constitutional exemption for in-
tangible personal property.86 The law provides for a five-year
phase-out beginning in the property tax year 1998. Similarly,
in North Carolina, the 1997 General Assembly approved Session
Law 1997-23, exempting most business intangible personal prop-
erty from the ad valorem local property tax base.88 In Georgia,
House Resolution 734 amended the state constitution to provide
that intangible personal property may be a separate class of
property for purposes of taxation and authorized the repeal of
any intangible personal property tax by general law without
approval in a referendum. 9
While most states do provide some sort of tax incentive for
businesses, 0 Virginia appears to be the only state with the con-
83. See Slaughter, supra note 7.
84. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b), (c).
85. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (providing for ad valorem taxation of only
real and tangible property); MO. CONST. art. X, § 6 (proclaiming intangible property
exempt from taxation); N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (levying a property tax only on
tangible property).
86. See Charles 0. Lorensen, Lawmakers Vote to Phase Out Intangibles Tax, 12
STATE TAX NOTES 1378, 1378 (1997), available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stamag
File. A 1984 amendment to the West Virginia Constitution exempted intangible per-
sonal property, but "[tihe effectiveness of the constitutional amendment was tied to
the implementation of a reappraisal program that was not directly implemented by
the Legislature." Id.
87. See id.
88. See Jack Cummings, Jr., Governor Signs Bill to Exempt Business Intangibles,
12 STATE TAX NOTES 1365, 1365-66 (1997) (describing the enactment of North Caro-
lina House Bill 295), available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stnmag File.
89. See Georgia HR 734, As Signed by Governor, Relates to Intangible Personal
Property, 96 STATE TAX NOTES, at *1, available in WESTLAW, 96 Stn 96-17.
90. See, e.g., Chris Micheli, A 50-State Comparison of Tax Incentives for Manufac-
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voluted system of defining certain tangible property as intangible
to avoid taxing business equipment. Although this makes direct
statutory state-to-state comparisons difficult, underlying most
state statutes are general policies regarding how far to extend
exemptions for manufacturers.91 For example, in the category of
sales and use tax, the rationale behind manufacturing exemp-
tions divides easily into two main schools of thought: (1) the
Ohio-Georgia rule, or physical change theory, and (2) the inte-
grated plant theory.9 2 Even though these two categories have not
been applied directly to Virginia's manufacturing tax statutes,
they provide useful insight into how different states approach
their own manufacturing exemptions.
Both the Ohio-Georgia rule and the integrated plant theory
are aimed at determining whether manufacturing machinery
and equipment is "used directly" in the manufacturing process.9'
Whereas the Ohio-Georgia rule restrictively construes the ex-
emption provisions and has its origin in administrative agency
rulings,94 "integrated plant theory is a doctrine of judicial ori-
gin."95 As such, the two theories approach the question of what
is "used directly" in manufacturing from fairly different perspec-
tives.
The Ohio-Georgia rule helps to "fulfill a revenue agency's
function of raising tax revenues."" This is accomplished under
the Ohio-Georgia rule by limiting the tax exemption to "machin-
turing Equipment Purchases, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 1739, 1739-43 (1997), available in
LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stnmnag File. Thirty-four states provide a full sales/use tax
exemption, seven states provide a partial sales/use tax exemption, nineteen states
provide an income or excise tax credit, five states do not levy a sales or use tax,
four states do not levy a corporate income or franchise tax, and three states do not
provide any tax incentives. See id.
91. See generally Douglas A. Hager, Kansas' Sales and Use Tax Law: Exemptions
for Manufacturing Machinery and Equipment and the Integrated Plant Theory, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 543, 561 (1998) (detailing the three typical inquiries involved in ap-
plying an exemption: (1) whether the operations classify as "manufacturing"; (2)
whether tangible personal property classifies as "machinery and equipment" under
state law; and (3) whether the machinery and equipment are "used directly" in man-
ufacturing).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 562.
94. See id. at 563.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 562.
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ery and equipment which perform a function involving a change
of the raw material involved into the finished product and ex-
cludes machinery and equipment used in preparation for manu-
facturing or after completion of the manufacturing process."97
The items excluded under this rule, "machinery used before
the... [manufacturing] process begins or after it ends," are not
considered to be used directly in manufacturing.9 8 Jurisdictions
that follow the restrictive view of the Ohio-Georgia rule appear
to focus their conclusions on "the strict rule of construction ap-
plicable to exemptions, and on applicable statutory or regulatory
provisions delineating when manufacturing begins and ends."99
In contrast, "[u]nder the integrated plant theory, machinery
and equipment are exempt if they perform an essential or indis-
pensable function in the taxpayer's manufacturing operations,
irrespective of whether they actually cause a physical change in
raw materials.' "0 0 The rule "excludes machinery involved in inci-
dental activities such as managerial and administrative func-
tions, and repair or maintenance activities."0 1 Whereas the
Ohio-Georgia rule is favored generally by state revenue agen-
cies,1 °2 state judicial branches have expressed their views that
exemptions dealing with manufacturing "should not be con-
strued in an impractical or overly restrictive fashion"0 ' by rely-
ing on integrated plant theory in their decisions.' °
The Virginia Supreme Court's holding in American Woodmark
does not fit neatly into either of these categories. First, while the
Ohio-Georgia rule is based on the strict rule of construction
97. Id. (quoting Floyd Charcoal Co. v. Director of Revenue, 599 S.W.2d 173, 176
(Mo. 1980)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 563.
100. Id. at 566 (quoting JORDAN M. GOODMAN ET AL., TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFO-
Lio, SALES AND USE TAXES: THE MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT EXEMPTION 1330.0008
(1997)); see also Niagara Power Corp. v. Wanamaker, 144 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995) (stating that the words "'directly and exclusively' should not be
construed to require the division into theoretically distinct stages of what is in fact
continuous and indivisible." (citation omitted)).
101. Hager, supra note 91, at 566-67.
102. See id. at 568.
103. Id. at 567.
104. See id.
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applicable to tax exemptions, 10 5 the court in American
Woodmark specifically rejected this argument,0 6 classifying
Virginia's manufacturing tax as an exception rather than an
exemption. Second, the computers, furniture, and office equip-
ment in American Woodmark's headquarters would not meet the
Ohio-Georgia rule test, which excludes machinery and equip-
ment used in preparation for manufacturing or after the comple-
tion of the manufacturing process. 7 According to the Virginia
Supreme Court, however, this equipment was indeed "used in
manufacturing" under the Virginia statute.' 8
American Woodmark defies categorization under the integrated
plant theory as well, because the rule specifically excludes ma-
chinery involved in managerial and administrative functions.0 9
The furniture, office equipment, and computer equipment in
question in American Woodmark certainly fall into this category.
The court nevertheless found that it was "used in manufactur-
ing" under Virginia law."
Because the American Woodmark decision does not adhere to
either of these theoretical constraints, it is helpful to examine
how other states handle their manufacturing tax exemptions.
For example, some states take a narrower view of manufactur-
ing exemptions than Virginia. Vermont adopted a regulation
interpreting a sales and use tax exemption for fuel used in man-
ufacturing."' The regulation carves out administration, sales,
retail operations, and parking as activities that are not direct or
indirect uses in manufacturing." If the taxpayer engages in
these activities in addition to exempt activities, the regulation
requires him to determine "by any reasonable means" the
105. See id. at 562-63.
106. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
108. See American Woodmark v. City of Winchester, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (Va.
1995); supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
110. See American Woodmark, 464 S.E.2d at 152; supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
111. See Manfuacturing Energy Regulation, Reg. 19741(34)-i (Vt. Dep't of Taxes
(1995)) (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'//www.state.vt.us/tax/regs.htm>.
112. See id. at Reg. 19741(34)-3.
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amount exempt from tax.1 3 Idaho recently expanded its personal
property tax exemption for intangible property to include, for
example, goodwill, patents, custom computer programs, franchises,
and licenses." 4 Before the bill passed, however, the legislature
amended it to "tighten the language by removing general refer-
ences to 'other intangible personal property' in describing prop-
erty exempt from the... tax.""5 The estimated value of property
that would be exempted from the tax is about $250 million," 6
and the loss in tax revenue is expected to cause a slight increase
in tax rates in Idaho."
On the other hand, much like Virginia, other states appear to
be broadening their manufacturing exemptions. For example, in
1997, the Colorado Department of Revenue approved new regu-
lations to clarify its sales and use tax on machinery." 8 Under
the new rules, purchases of machinery or machine tools are ex-
empt from state sales tax if they are "to be used in Colorado
directly and predominantly in manufacturing tangible or personal
property."" The old law required the machinery be used "exclu-
sively" in manufacturing; the addition of the term "predomi-
nantly" expands the prior law."
Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to
narrow the sales and use tax exemption for equipment in manu-
facturing.' 2 ' The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts found
113. Id. at Reg. 19741(34)-4.
114. See John McGown, Bill Would Exempt More Intangible Personal Property from
Tax, 14 STATE TAX NOTES 868 (1998). Idaho had pre('iously exempted such intangi-
bles as "capital stock, bonds, and deposits in national banks, state banks, and sav-
ings and loan associations." Id.
115. John McGown, Governor Signs Bill Broadening Intangibles Tax Exemption, 14
STATE TAX NOTES 1139 (1998).
116. See McGown, supra note 114, at 868.
117. See id.
118. See Robert A. Wherry, Jr., State Adopts Sales and Use Tax Pegs on Machinery
Exemption, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 1283 (1997).
119. Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-114(11) (1998) (exempting purchases of
machinery or machine tools by a person engaged in manufacturing to be used in
manufacturing tangible personal property).
120. Wherry, supra note 118, at 1283 (noting that "the term 'predominantly,' as
used in the regulations, is defined . . . [as] more than 50% of any use").
121. Michael W. McLoughlin, Comptroller's Policy Held to Contradict Legislative
Intent, 10 STATE TAX NOTES 1159 (1996).
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that the mold-making equipment of a pipe manufacturer did not
qualify for the exemption because the equipment. did not come
into direct contact with the finished, manufactured product.122
The court of appeals rejected this limit, holding that a strict
statutory interpretation conflicted with legislative intent in en-
acting the statute. 2 '
Finally, the Illinois Appellate Court recently held that equip-
ment involved in the transporting of goods from one manufactur-
ing plant to another qualifies for the manufacturing and equip-
ment exemption under Illinois law." In Zenith Elec. Corp. v. Il-
linois Dep't of Revenue,'125 the court found that trays used to
protect cathode ray tubes used in televisions and computer mon-
itors were exempt even though identical goods were sold to third
parties as finished goods, 2 and therefore would not be exempt.
Other states have interpreted the exemption more broadly. In
the case of a clothing wholesaler that used independent contrac-
tors in the manufacturing process, the Texas Comptroller per-
mitted the wholesaler to invoke the exemption even though
third parties performed the actual manufacturing. 27
Although the American Woodmark decision is not easily cate-
gorized by either of the theoretical rationales for providing man-
ufacturing tax exemptions, on a more practical level, Virginia,
like many other states, seems willing to enlarge the tax breaks
offered to manufacturing businesses. By expanding the types of
manufacturing property included as intangible personal property,
while excluding machinery and tools of a manufacturing busi-
ness from the same definition, the Virginia Supreme Court has
greatly narrowed the business property taxable by cities and
122. See id. at 1159.
123. See id. at 1159-60 (noting that "the statute was enacted to (1) encourage eco-
nomic development in the state, (2) to avoid pyramiding of the sales tax, and (3) to
strike a balance between avoiding multiple taxation and the need to raise revenue").
124. See Garland Allen et al., Appeals Court: CRT Trays Fall Under Manufacturing
Exemption, 13 STATE TAX NOTES 1463 (1997).
125. 688 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
126. See id.; Allen et al., supra note 124, at 1463.
127. See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 51 SMU L. REV. 1345, 1350 (1998)
(citing Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,448, 1997 Tax. Tax LEXIS 84, at *8
(Jan. 30, 1997)).
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counties. Though the repercussions of this trend are undoubtedly
favorable for Virginia business,2 they may bear some response
from Virginia local government.
REPERCUSSIONS OF AMERICAN WOODMARK
Virginia businesses are undoubtedly aware of the broad poten-
tial for tax relief resulting from the American Woodmark deci-
sion and continue to push for further expansion of the statutory
language on the circuit court level. For example, Coca-Cola re-
cently filed suit in the Circuit Court for the City of Clifton
Forge, Virginia, claiming that equipment used in the retail and
distribution functions of its manufacturing business could be
excluded from property tax after American Woodmark2 9 In yet
another counterintuitive decision, the court held that the vend-
ing machines and advertising scoreboards used by Coca-Cola
were not subject to local property tax under the manufacturer's
exemption.'
The circuit court ruled that Coca-Cola, although engaged in
both manufacturing and retail sales, was a manufacturing busi-
ness for purposes of the Virginia Code.' Encouraged by this
128. But see Laura Ellen Johnson, Note, Spurring Economic Development in Kansas
Through Property Tax Exemptions-Are We Getting the Results We Want?, 30
WASHBURN L.J. 82 (1990) (criticizing the ability of a manufacturing inventory tax
exemption in Kansas to spur economic development).
129. See A.W. Hauslohner, Coke Machine Tax Revolt Underway, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library.
.130. See id. This holding, however, is contrary to decisions in other states that
have considered the taxation of vending machines. See, e.g., Associated Beverage Co.
v. Board of Equalization, 273 Cal. Rptr. 639, 648 (1990) (stating that the soft drink
bottler was a "distributor" of the product for purposes of the statute imposing sales
tax at retail rate); Macke Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 285 A.2d
593, 599 (Md. 1972) (explaining that hot and cold vending machines did not fall
within the manufacturing equipment exemption provisions of the tax statute because
"the average man would not think of vending machine operation as manufacturing").
131. See Hauslohner, supra note 129, at Al. But see Poindexter, supra note 5, at
BI (describing a similar case involving Coca-Cola in Botetout County in which the
judge ruled that vending machines are not part of the manufacturing process). Ac-
cording to the judge in this case:
we may infer that selling a Coca-Cola from a vending machine aids the
principal operation of manufacturing the product, . . . since, again, the
product has no commercial meaning if it is not sold and consumed. Thus
the machines may in fact be "used in" the manufacturing process.
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decision, other manufacturers filed requests for tax refunds with
Virginia local government in hopes of cementing expansion of
the exemption. 132 Not surprisingly, local governments are trying
to fight the effects of the Clifton Forge holding in an attempt to
fend off further erosion of the local tax base. 3
3
The American Woodmark decision also raises the question of
whether the manufacturer's exemption can be extended to equip-
ment leased, as opposed to owned, by a manufacturing busi-
ness."8 This may provide Virginia businesses another avenue by
which to extend American Woodmark. For example, in City of
Martinsville v. Tultex Corp.,35 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that personal property leased to and used in a manufacturing
business is classified as intangible personal property segregated
for state taxation only, despite the fact that the property actually
was owned by a nonmanufacturer.'3 6 Thus, leased equipment
used by a manufacturing business may not be subject to local
personal property tax, regardless of the status of the actual title
holder.13
7
Virginia consumers also have a reason to be concerned about
American Woodmark. As legislative and judicial constraints
relieve Virginia businesses of an increasing amount of the state's
tax burden, conslimers may end up carrying more of this bur-
den. 8 For example, as personal property tax exemptions for
On the other hand, the retailing of the product may be a separate
trade or business carried on by the Petitioner whose left hand, so to
speak, is engaged in brewing and bottling Coca-Cola and whose right
hand is engaged in marketing and retailing the product as a separate
activity.
Letter from Judge George E. Honts, III, Botetourt County Circuit Court, to D.
French Slaughter, III, McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe and William L. Heartwell,
III, 3-4 (July 16, 1998) (on file with author).
132. See, e.g., supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Poindexter, supra note 5, at B1.
134. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999) (refer-
ring to property 'used in manufacturing," not property owned by a manufacturing
business); see also Slaughter, supra note 7, at 15 (identifying the same question).
135. 381 S.E.2d 6 (Va. 1989).
136. See id. at 8.
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 128, at 82 ("Individuals, organizations, and busi-
nesses that have property remaining on the tax rolls bear a greater burden of sup-
porting the needs of local and state governments when other properties are exempt-
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businesses expand, Virginia cities and counties stand to lose
millions of dollars in tax revenue.139 On the state level, Virginia
Governor Jim Gilmore proposed to phase-out the individual
personal property tax on items like cars, boats, and motor
homes, causing some members of the Virginia legislature to
claim they will be forced to raise other taxes to offset the lost
revenue.1 ° This situation parallels the tax trade-off faced by
other states. For example, Milwaukee recently proposed exempt-
ing computer equipment of businesses from personal property
tax, a move estimated to remove about $346 million from the
city's property tax rolls. 41 While business leaders argued that
the exemption was necessary to spur economic development,
critics countered that the move was "nothing more than property
tax shifting." Because businesses generally are more influen-
tial lobbyists than are consumers, it is reasonable to assume
that Virginia consumers may well bear some of the burden of a
subtly expanding manufacturing tax exemption, despite state-
level efforts to reduce personal property taxes for individuals.'
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE COUNTERINTUITIVE
RESULTS OF AMERICAN WOODMARK
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the American Woodmark
decision has the potential to cause significant expansion of
Virginia's property tax exemption for manufacturers.' Although
ed.").
139. See Long, supra note 43, at 1; see also supra note 7 (describing the breakdown
of federal, state, and local revenue collected by Virginia cities and counties).
140. See Mark Yost, Gilmore's Plans for Virginia Are Tall Order, WALL ST. J., Dec.
5, 1997, at A12.
141. See Avrum D. Lank, Bill Would Kill Tax on Computers: Exemption for Busi-
nesses Could Force 2.4% Property Tax Increase in Milwaukee, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, July 15, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library.
142. Id. The change was estimated to increase Milwaukee's property tax -rate by
about 2.4%. See id.
143. See STATE AND LOCAL GOVT RESP. AND TAXING AUTH. CO1lN, FINAL REPORT,
H. Doc. No. 88, Regular Sess. 8 (Va. 1998). According to the Virginia Municipal
League (VML) and the Virginia Association of Counties (VACo), the estimated annu-
al cost of a $20,000 exemption on personal vehicles would be more than $1.3 billion
in 2003 when the plan is fully implemented. See id. Both VML and VACo expressed
concerns about the state consistently funding such an amount. See id.
144. See supra notes 36, 40-42, 60-62 and accompanying text.
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the Virginia legislature signaled its approval of American
Woodmark by amending Virginia Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2) to codi-
fy the court's holding,145 in the end the resulting tax loophole
may be much greater than Virginia lawmakers intended. For
example, one goal of the manufacturing exemption is to encour-
age manufacturing businesses to locate or expand their opera-
tions in Virginia. 146 As noted above, however, the practical effect
of American Woodmark is to exempt all tangible personal prop-
erty used in a manufacturing business except the machinery and
tools actually used in the manufacturing process.'47 This holding
"discourages the location of labor intensive (job creating) manu-
facturing operations in Virginia, while giving a major tax exemp-
tion to the non-revenue producing labor-conserving aspects of a
manufacturing business such as warehousing and administra-
tive operations."'4 s In this respect, both the court and the legisla-
ture have approved a counterintuitive manufacturing tax break
that exceeds the original intent behind the exemption.
Recommendations
In the tax arena, local government has been hurt by recent
decisions in Brown Boveri Inc.,'49 American Woodmark, 50 and
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 5' If businesses continue to win expan-
sions to Virginia's manufacturing exemption, even at the circuit
court level, local governments will have a difficult time trying to
145. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
146. See Crawford, supra note 8, at 1; see also American Woodmark Corp. v. City
of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421, 434 (1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 464 S.E.2d
148 (Va. 1995) ("The term manufacturing is to be construed liberally because 'the
public policy of Virginia is to encourage manufacturing in the Commonwealth.")
(citing County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 380 S.E.2d 890, 893 (Va.
1989)).
147. See Crawford, supra note 8, at 1.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the Brown Boveri hold-
ing that a business could be classified as a manufacturer even if it engaged in both
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing activities).
150. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (listing some of the cities and
counties in Virginia who have requested tax refunds and discussing the dollar
amounts at stake in refund challenges).
151. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (describing how businesses are
attempting to cement the American Woodmark holding on the circuit court level).
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narrow the exemption when these cases reach the Virginia Su-
preme Court. The following approaches should help counties and
cities defend against these challenges at the circuit court level.
The first applicable defense for local governments is to argue
that the business in question is not a manufacturer. 5 2 In
Prentice v. City of Richmond,"' the Virginia Supreme Court laid
out the test for what constitutes manufacturing.1" The court
stated, "[mianufacture implies a change, but every change is not
manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of
treatment, labor, and manipulation. But something more is
necessary .... There must be transformation; a new and differ-
ent article must emerge, 'having a distinctive name, character or
use.') 55 Although Virginia precedent does not establish a bright-
line rule describing exactly what type of business qualifies as a
manufacturer,1'5 a challenge to manufacturing status may be
relevant whenever the process can be characterized as mixing,
blending, or processing. 117 Although this approach will not be
relevant in every case, local governments should not overlook
this argument as a first step in relevant tax refund challenges.
In a related approach, it is essential that the locality find out
as much as possible about the original material that is being
used by the petitioner in the manufacturing process during pre-
trial discovery. 58 "The evidence in these cases is almost totally
within the Petitioner's control,"'59 and "[tlhe locality must be ag-
gressive at the discovery stage if the evidence at trial is to be
152. See Heartwell, supra note 4, at 3.
153. 90 S.E.2d 839 (Va. 1956).
154. See id. at 842.
155. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. Richmond Dairy Co., 157 S.E. 728 (Va. 1931)
(quoting Anheuser-Busch Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1907)).
156. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (describing businesses classified
as manufacturers under Virginia law).
157. See Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 261 S.E.2d 532, 534
(Va. 1980).
158. See Heartwell, supra note 4, at 8.
159. Id.; see also Letter from Judge George E. Honts, III to D. French Slaughter,
III, supra note 131, at 1-2 (denying summary judgment in Coca.Cola Bottling Co. v.
County of Botetourt and stating [i]t appears from the argument of both counsel that
the Petitioner receives a mysterious blend of ingredients, the composition of which or
the recipe for which is one of the most jealously and zealously guarded secrets
known to man . . . ').
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fairly tested."6 ' Another possible strategy is for local govern-
ment to argue that manufacturing and retail operations should
be considered as a separate line of business.16' Although the trial
court in American Woodmark found that the Commissioner of
Revenue cannot "vivisect" a business into its component parts,
62
the Virginia Supreme Court did not address this argument in its
decision. 63 However, Virginia Code § 58.1-5 states "[w]hen any
person, firm or corporation is engaged in more than one business
which is made by law subject to taxation, such person, firm or
corporation shall pay the tax provided by law on each branch of
his, their or its business.""6 Similarly, under Caffee v. City of
Portsmouth,165 the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
manufacturer's use of equipment in distribution and retail sales
made that property subject to local tax.166 Although Caffee in-
volved a Business, Professional, Occupational and License
(BPOL) tax, in which retail and wholesale sales are treated
differently, the case still may serve as effective precedent for the
argument that the "separate business" distinction should carry
over to the property tax exemption, as these two taxes have a
number of similarities. For example, the Virginia Tax
Department's guidelines for the BPOL tax incorporated the
three-element analysis used by the Virginia Supreme Court in
Prentice to determine whether a business activity should be
considered manufacturing. 1 ' Therefore, the manufacturing tests
for both the property tax and the BPOL tax overlap.'68 Second,
the Virginia General Assembly recently passed a major bill to
reform the BPOL tax with the goal of administering this tax
160. Heartwell, supra note 4, at 8.
161. See id. at 9.
162. See American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421, 435
(1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 464 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 1995).
163. See City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 464 S.E.2d 148 (Va.
1995).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-5 (Michie 1997).
165. 128 S.E.2d 421 (Va. 1962).
166. See id. at 424.
167. See VIRGINIA DEP'T OF TAXATION, REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPIN-
ION-BusmESS, PROFESSIONAL, AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE (BPOL) TAX 2-3 (Mar. 5,
1998).
168. See supra note 44 (describing the three-part test articulated by the court in
Prentice v. City of Richmond).
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uniformly throughout the Commonwealth.'69 This signals the
legislature's intent to promote consistency among Virginia's
various tax statutes, which could include eliminating discrep-
ancies between the BPOL tax and the personal property tax
exemption for manufacturers.
On the other hand, the separate line of business defense is
weakened by Brown Boveri,'70 which found the nonmanu-
facturing activities of a business were "ancillary to its primary
business [activity] of manufacturing" and therefore not subject to
local tax.171 "Resolving the legal tension between section 58.1-5
and Caffee on the one hand, and Brown Boveri on the other, is
the obvious key to the success of the separate lines of business
defense."172
Finally, Virginia cities and counties should consider legislative
remedies to slow the expansion of the American Woodmark hold-
ing because the Virginia Code seems to contain opposing incen-
tives in its sales tax and property tax provisions. For example,
property that is "used directly" in manufacturing is exempt from
sales tax, 73 but is taxable as machinery and tools for property
tax purposes. 74 This creates an incentive for manufacturers to
pursue the already broad property tax exclusion. Amending §
58.1 to read "equipment used directly in manufacturing" to
match the current interpretation of the machinery and tools
exemption would eliminate these inconsistent definitions in
Virginia's sales and use tax and personal property tax provi-
sions.
Changing the language of the statute is also an appropriate
remedy to keep pace with technological change. In many states,
statutes have not evolved with the advances in technology that
have changed profoundly taxpayers' businesses, particularly in
the areas of computers, software, and telecommunications dur-
169. See Bell, supra note 22, at 1603.
170. See County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 380 S.E.2d 890, 894
(Va. 1989); see also supra note 56 (discussing the court's distinction between manu-
facturing and nonmanufacturing activities).
171. Brown Boveri, 380 S.E.2d at 894.
172. Heartwell, supra note 4, at 8.
173. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.3 (Michie 1997).
174. See American Woodmark v. City of Winchester, 464 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1995);
supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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ing the last ten to twenty years. 75 As a result, "taxpayers and
state auditors struggle with determining the taxability of a
transaction by applying obsolete definitions which are forced to
fit current business practices."176 This can result in both opportu-
nities and pitfalls in the taxation of intangibles, 177 and becomes
increasingly important as Virginia attempts to draw more tech-
nology and computer companies into the state. 178
CONCLUSION
The American Woodmark case has important implications for
the tax base of local government. If businesses are successful in
their attempts to expand Virginia's manufacturing tax exemp-
tion, the financial impact on localities will be significant. Al-
though the goal behind the tax incentive is to create a favorable
environment for Virginia manufacturers, the current exemption
benefits businesses already established in Virginia without any
requirement that they create new jobs, expand, or otherwise
promote economic development. In addition, it apparently gives
manufacturers with a retail component a competitive advantage
over those businesses that engage solely in retail. Further inter-
pretations of the statute may extend the exemption to include
equipment leased by manufacturing businesses and may have
unintended consequences if Virginia consumers are forced to
bear more of the state's tax burden. Even though expanding the
manufacturing tax exemption undoubtedly benefits Virginia
businesses, local government should take precautions to ensure
that the state's long-term tax base is both balanced and equita-
ble.
Stacey L. Wilson
175. See Virginia A. Gates, Coming to Grips with the Taxation of High-Tech Intan-
gibles, 6 STATE TAX NOTES 1017 (1994).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., Yost, supra note 140 (noting that parts of Virginia have become
known as the "Silicon Crescent", home to companies such as White Oak Semiconduc-
tor, CyberCash, and Iridium World Communications, Ltd.).
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